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SPOILING A FRESH START: IN RE DAWES 
AND A FAMILY FARMER’S ABILITY TO 
REORGANIZE UNDER CHAPTER 12  
OF THE U.S. BANKRUPTCY CODE 
Abstract: On June 21, 2011, the Tenth Circuit, in In re Dawes, held that 
post-petition capital gains taxes are incurred by the individual debtor rather 
than the bankruptcy estate. Consequently, such tax liabilities are not eligi-
ble for downgrade and discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 1222(a)(2)(A). This 
Comment argues that, although the Dawes decision contradicts the legisla-
tive intent underlying the enactment of Chapter 12, it correctly interprets 
the plain language of the statute. 
Introduction 
 Traditionally, an insolvent family farmer seeking protection under 
U.S. bankruptcy law faced unique challenges.1 The illiquid nature of 
farming assets inhibited a family farmer’s ability to restructure liabilities 
while remaining operational.2 To address such difficulties, Congress en-
acted Chapter 12 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.3 Chapter 12 eases family 
farmers’ financial burden in bankruptcy by downgrading post-petition 
tax liabilities “incurred by the estate” to unsecured, non-priority claims, 
eligible for downgrade and discharge.4 
 Interpreting Chapter 12 in In re Dawes (Dawes III ) on June 21, 
2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that capital 
                                                                                                                      
1 See generally Katherine M. Porter, Phantom Farmers: Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code, 79 
Am. Bankr. L.J. 729 (2005) (examining the history and efficacy of Chapter 12 of the 
Bankruptcy Code). 
2 Id. at 737–38. 
3 Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 
U.S.C.); see Porter, supra note 1, at 731. 
4 11 U.S.C. § 1222 (2006). The Code provides in relevant part: 
The plan shall . . . provide for the full payment, in deferred cash payments, of 
all claims entitled to priority under section 507, unless . . . the claim is a claim 
owed to a governmental unit that arises as a result of the sale, transfer, ex-
change, or other disposition of any farm asset used in the debtor’s farming 
operation, in which case the claim shall be treated as an unsecured claim that 
is not entitled to priority under section 507 . . . . 
Id. 
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gains taxes arising from the post-petition sale of farmland are incurred 
by the individual debtor rather than the bankruptcy estate.5 Therefore, 
those taxes remain priority claims that must be paid in full.6 
 The Tenth Circuit was the third U.S. Court of Appeals to address 
the question in recent years.7 In 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit held, in United States v. Hall, that the individual debtor 
incurs post-petition capital gains taxes, rendering the tax liabilities non-
dischargeable.8 Conversely, in 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit held, in Knudsen v. IRS, that the bankruptcy estate incurs 
those taxes, which are thus eligible for downgrade and discharge.9 
 Part I of this Comment outlines Chapter 12 of the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Code and describes how the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have inter-
preted the phrase “incurred by the estate.”10 Then, Part II discusses the 
Tenth Circuit’s rationale for holding that post-petition capital gains 
taxes are not incurred by the estate.11 Finally, Part III argues that, al-
though the Tenth Circuit’s decision appears contrary to the legislative 
intent of Chapter 12, it is the correct interpretation in light of the plain 
text of the statute.12 
I. Interpreting Chapter 12 
A. Protecting the American Family Farmer 
 American bankruptcy law has a long tradition of providing special 
protections to family farmers.13 Since 1898, creditors have been unable 
to force a bankruptcy without the farmer’s consent.14 Yet, in the 1980s, 
                                                                                                                      
5 652 F.3d 1236, 1239 (10th Cir. 2011). 
6 Id. (“[P]ost petition income taxes incurred during Chapter 12 proceedings are li-
abilities of the individual debtor and not the bankruptcy estate. . . . [T]he taxes are due 
from the debtor personally, and the IRS’s recourse remains exclusively with the individual 
debtor . . . unaffected by the bankruptcy discharge.”). 
7 Compare Dawes III, 652 F.3d at 1239 (holding that post-petition capital gains taxes aris-
ing from the sale of farm assets remain liabilities of the individual debtor), and United 
States v. Hall, 617 F.3d 1161, 1163 (9th Cir. 2010) (same), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 2989 
(2011), with Knudsen v. IRS, 581 F.3d 696, 706 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that post-petition 
capital gains taxes arising from the sale of farm assets are incurred by the bankruptcy es-
tate and are subject to downgrade and discharge). 
8 617 F.3d at 1163. 
9 581 F.3d at 710. 
10 See infra notes 13–59 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 60–79 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 80–102 and accompanying text. 
13 Porter, supra note 1, at 730. 
14 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978); see Porter, supra note 
1, at 730. 
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the deterioration of the U.S. economy’s agricultural sector caused a 
dramatic increase in the number of family farm bankruptcies.15 At the 
height of this agricultural crisis, farm bankruptcy rates surpassed previ-
ous highs reached during the Great Depression.16 Congress responded 
by enacting Chapter 12 as a component of the Bankruptcy Judges, 
United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986.17 
 Chapter 12 provides specialized bankruptcy relief to family farmers 
and family fishermen.18 Specifically, Chapter 12 addresses difficulties in 
reorganization inherent to distressed family farms.19 By enacting Chap-
ter 12, the legislature intended to assist farmers by allowing them to 
restructure liabilities to mitigate the risk of total liquidation and the 
need to abandon farming.20 
B. Non-priority of Taxes “Incurred by the Estate” 
 Before the enactment of Chapter 12, a farmer was required to ac-
count for the full payment of all tax obligations in the bankruptcy 
plan.21 Consequently, a farmer who sold farm assets to raise capital dur-
ing bankruptcy would remain fully liable for all capital gains taxes that 
arose as a result of that sale.22 Under Chapter 12, however, certain tax 
liabilities may be downgraded to non-priority status, subject to pro rata 
                                                                                                                      
15 Jonathan K. Van Patten, Chapter 12 in the Courts, 38 S.D. L. Rev. 52, 52 (1993). 
16 Porter, supra note 1, at 740 (“In 1987, immediately after Chapter 12’s passage, there 
were 5788 Chapter 12 bankruptcies. This was the height of the 1980s farm crisis and trans-
lates to a bankruptcy rate of 21.7 per 10,000 farms, a record that broke the previous high 
set during the Great Depression.”). 
17 Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3105 (1986). Chapter 12 was designed to temporarily 
alleviate pressures caused by the agricultural crisis, and initially contained a seven-year 
sunset provision. Porter, supra note 1, at 729, 733. Chapter 12 was extended eleven times 
and became a permanent part of the Bankruptcy Code with the passage of the Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23; 
Porter, supra note 1, at 729, 733. 
18 11 U.S.C. § 109(f) (2006). 
19 Porter, supra note 1, at 732. 
20 See Van Patten, supra note 15, at 52–53. 
[T]he measure of the crisis in agriculture isn’t measured by cold numbers on 
a page. Instead, I measure it in terms of the human tragedy, the disruption of 
lives, and the despair of being a middle-aged farmer suddenly told to find an-
other livelihood to support a family. . . . We must stop the bleeding on the 
farm. 
Id. (quoting 132 Cong. Rec. S15,074–05 (1986) (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley)). 
21 See Brendon Hansen, Note, All That Glitters Isn’t Gold: Deciphering in re Knudsen’s Tax 
Allocation Methods Under 11 U.S.C. § 1222(a)(2)(A) for Chapter 12 Debtors, 44 U.C. Davis L. 
Rev. 651, 654 (2010). 
22 Porter, supra note 1, at 737–38. 
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payment or discharge.23 By relinquishing the priority status of these 
claims, the government favors the continued operation of family farms 
over the full capture of tax revenues.24 
 Under Chapter 12, a bankruptcy plan must provide for the full 
payment of all claims entitled to priority under 11 U.S.C. § 507.25 Yet, 
Chapter 12 excludes from this requirement a claim “owed to a gov-
ernmental unit that arises as a result of the sale, transfer, exchange, or 
other disposition of any farm asset used in the debtor’s farming opera-
tion . . . .”26 Thus, Chapter 12 provides that a capital gains tax liability 
entitled to priority under section 507, may be downgraded to a non-
priority, unsecured claim.27 Section 507 identifies “administrative ex-
penses allowed under section 503(b)” as claims entitled to priority.28 
Section 503(b) defines an administrative expense as “any tax . . . in-
curred by the estate.”29 Consequently, if post-petition taxes are “in-
curred by the estate” rather than the individual debtor, they are subject 
to downgrade and discharge under Chapter 12.30 
C. The Daweses’ Argument for Downgrade 
 In 1988, Donald W. Dawes and Phyllis C. Dawes were convicted of 
willfully failing to file income tax returns for their family farm.31 On Oc-
tober 23, 2006, the government notified the Daweses that it intended to 
take possession of eight tracts of their property.32 Yet, before the gov-
ernment could act, the Daweses filed for Chapter 12 bankruptcy.33 
 The Daweses’ Chapter 12 plan proposed to satisfy the Internal 
Revenue Service’s (IRS) outstanding tax claim by surrendering the 
eight parcels of land.34 The plan contained a provision stating that “all 
claims of the IRS or Kansas Department of Revenue that arise post-
                                                                                                                      
23 11 U.S.C. § 1222(a)(2)(A); see Porter, supra note 1, at 738. 
24 See Porter, supra note 1, at 738. 
25 11 U.S.C. § 1222(a)(2). 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. § 507(a)(2); see id. § 503(b). 
29 Id. § 503(b). 
30 See id. §§ 503(b), 507(a)(2), 1222(a)(2); see also Dawes III, 652 F.3d at 1238–39 (ana-
lyzing “whether income taxes flowing from the sale of a farm asset during a Chapter 12 
bankruptcy are taxes ‘incurred by the estate’ and so subject to downgrade and discharge”). 
31 In re Dawes (Dawes II ), 415 B.R. 815, 817 (D. Kan. 2009), rev’d, 652 F.3d 1236 (10th 
Cir. 2011). 
32 In re Dawes (Dawes I ), 382 B.R. 509, 512 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2008), aff’d, 415 B.R. 815 
(D. Kan. 2009), rev’d, 652 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2011). 
33 Dawes II, 415 B.R. at 818. 
34 Id. 
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petition as a result of the sale, transfer, exchange, or other disposition 
of the . . . parcels shall be treated as a general unsecured claim not enti-
tled to priority under [section] 507.”35 With this proposal, the Daweses 
attempted to disclaim the priority status of any income tax liabilities 
arising from the liquidation of the bankruptcy estate.36 The IRS ob-
jected to this proposal and rejected the Daweses’ bankruptcy plan.37 
The disagreement was not immediately addressed and the Daweses sold 
the parcels, generating proceeds in excess of $900,000.38 Because the 
farmland’s value had increased during the Daweses’ ownership, the sale 
generated a significant capital gains tax liability.39 
 On November 13, 2006, the Daweses filed a Chapter 12 plan.40 On 
August 9, 2007, the Daweses filed a motion for partial summary judg-
ment, requesting that the Bankruptcy Court approve their bankruptcy 
plan and downgrade the post-petition capital gains tax incurred as a 
result of the sale to an unsecured claim.41 They claimed that the bank-
ruptcy estate incurred the post-petition capital gains taxes.42 Accord-
ingly, they argued, under 11 U.S.C. § 1222(a), that the taxes were sub-
ject to downgrade to non-priority status.43 In contrast, the IRS argued 
that post-petition income taxes remain liabilities of an individual 
debtor and are therefore not eligible for downgrade and discharge.44 
 Ultimately, the case was brought before the Tenth Circuit,45 which 
held that the post-petition income taxes incurred during Chapter 12 
bankruptcy were incurred by the individual debtor and not by the 
bankruptcy estate.46 Consequently, the tax liability from the sale of 
farm assets remained a non-dischargeable priority claim.47 
                                                                                                                      
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 817. 
39 Dawes I, 382 B.R. at 512. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 1222(a)(2)(2006). 
44 Dawes I, 382 B.R. at 512. 
45 The Bankruptcy Court accepted the Daweses’ argument and granted their motion. 
Id. at 509. The U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas affirmed the judgment, Dawes 
II, 415 B.R. at 824, and the IRS appealed to the Tenth Circuit, Dawes III, 652 F.3d at 1238. 
46 Dawes III, 652 F.3d at 1239. 
47 Id. 
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D. Competing Interpretations Among the Circuits 
 Prior to the Tenth Circuit’s ruling in Dawes III, two Courts of Ap-
peals had considered whether post-petition taxes resulting from the sale 
of a farm asset during Chapter 12 bankruptcy are incurred by the estate 
and therefore subject to downgrade and discharge.48 Both courts inter-
preted the phrase “incurred by the estate” in light of the related statu-
tory framework governing the Chapter 12 bankruptcy process.49 Yet, the 
courts relied on different sections of the U.S. Code to resolve the con-
troversy and offered conflicting definitions of “incurred by the estate.”50 
 In 2009, in Knudsen v. IRS, the Eighth Circuit held that the bank-
ruptcy estate, rather than the individual debtor, incurs such taxes.51 It 
did so by relying on its 1995 decision, In re L.J. O’Neill Shoe Co., in which 
it held that the phrase “incurred by the estate” means “incurred post-
petition.”52 Accordingly, the Knudsen court declined to alter the mean-
ing of “incurred by the estate.”53 Furthermore, the court supported this 
interpretation by noting the property included in Chapter 12’s defini-
tion of a bankruptcy estate.54 A bankruptcy estate includes “all legal or 
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement 
of the case.”55 Thus, because the taxes arose due to a sale of property 
held by the bankruptcy estate, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the 
estate incurred the resulting liabilities.56 
 In contrast, in 2010 in United States v. Hall, the Ninth Circuit held 
that post-petition taxes from the sale of farm assets are liabilities of the 
individual debtor.57 The Ninth Circuit relied on section 1399 of the In-
ternal Revenue Code, which indicates that a Chapter 12 estate is not a 
taxable entity.58 Thus, because a Chapter 12 estate cannot be taxed, the 
Ninth Circuit held that the individual debtor must incur the post-
petition tax liability.59 
                                                                                                                      
48 See Hall, 617 F.3d at 1163; Knudsen, 581 F.3d at 706. 
49 See Hall, 617 F.3d at 1163; Knudsen, 581 F.3d at 710. 
50 Hall, 617 F.3d at 1163; Knudsen, 581 F.3d at 710. 
51 581 F.3d at 710. 
52 Id. at 709 (citing In re L.J. O’Neill Shoe Co., 64 F.3d 1146, 1146 (8th Cir. 1995)). 
53 Id. (citing In re Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 37 F.3d 982, 984 (3d Cir. 1994); 
In re Balt. Marine Indus., 344 B.R 407, 414 (Bankr. D. Md. 2006)). 
54 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1207(a) (2006)). 
55 11 U.S.C. § 541. 
56 Knudsen, 581 F.3d at 709–10. 
57 617 F.3d at 1163. 
58 Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 1399). 
59 Id. 
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II. The Tenth Circuit’s Rationale 
 In Dawes III, following the rationale of the Eighth Circuit’s 2009 
decision in Knudsen v. IRS, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the debtor, 
and not the estate, “incurs” the post-petition tax liabilities in a Chapter 
12 bankruptcy.60 Evaluating whether the Daweses’ capital gains liabili-
ties should be classified as non-priority claims, the Tenth Circuit con-
cluded that (1) the taxes are owed to the government and (2) the tax 
liability arose from the sale of farm assets.61 Accordingly, the only re-
maining issue was whether the tax claims were administrative expenses 
“incurred by the estate” and were therefore entitled to priority under 
section 507.62 
 The Tenth Circuit began its interpretation of the phrase “incurred 
by the estate” by examining the plain language of section 503(b).63 The 
court, referring to the legal definition of “incur,” concluded that “one 
who has ‘incurred’ an expense is liable for it.”64 Yet, because the Bank-
ruptcy Code does not designate who is liable for a capital gains tax, the 
court looked to underlying income tax law.65 Under the Internal Reve-
nue Code, tax liabilities depend on the chapter under which the bank-
ruptcy was filed.66 For example, in Chapter 11 bankruptcies, a trustee is 
directed to file a separate tax return on behalf of the bankruptcy es-
tate.67 In Chapter 12 bankruptcies, however, the debtor remains per-
sonally responsible for the filing and payment of post-petition federal 
income taxes.68 Thus, the Dawes III court reasoned that, because the in-
dividual debtor remains liable for filing a tax return, the debtor incurs 
the tax claim.69 
 In doing so, the Dawes III court implicitly rejected the Eighth Cir-
cuit’s conclusion that the phrase “incurred by the estate” is equivalent to 
                                                                                                                      
60 In re Dawes (Dawes III ), 652 F.3d 1236, 1240 (10th Cir. 2011); see Knudsen v. IRS, 581 
F.3d 696, 706 (8th Cir. 2009). 
61 Dawes III, 652 F.3d at 1238. 
62 Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 507. 
63 Dawes III, 652 F.3d at 1239; see 11 U.S.C. § 503(b). 
64 Dawes III, 652 F.3d at 1239 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 782 (8th ed. 2004)) 
(“Black’s Law Dictionary tells us that to ‘incur’ means to ‘suffer or bring on oneself,’ as in 
a ‘liability or expense.’”). 
65 Id. (“To determine who has ‘incurred’ a tax, then, we must ask who is liable for pay-
ing it. And to answer that question we must look to the relevant tax authority.”). 
66 I.R.C. §§ 1398(c), 1399 (2006). 
67 Id. § 1398(c). 
68 Id. § 1399. 
69 652 F.3d at 1240 (holding that “because a Chapter 12 . . . estate isn’t liable for post-
petition federal income taxes, the estate does not incur such taxes”). 
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“incurred during bankruptcy.”70 By interpreting the phrase “incurred 
by” to mean “liable for,” the court limited itself to analyzing only who 
incurred the liability,71 though acknowledged that a bankruptcy estate 
cannot possibly incur liabilities until after a petition is filed.72 By analyz-
ing who incurs such liabilities, the court declined to conclude that all tax 
liabilities arising post-petition are incurred by the bankruptcy estate.73 
 Furthermore, the Dawes III court noted that permitting the down-
grade of all post-petition tax liabilities would contradict Chapter 13 of 
the bankruptcy code.74 Chapter 13 expressly grants the government the 
option of including in the bankruptcy estate any post-petition taxes in-
curred by the individual debtor.75 Therefore, according to the Dawes 
court, holding that the bankruptcy estate incurs all post-petition tax 
liabilities would contradict the choice provided to the government in 
Chapter 13.76 In addition, the phrase “incurred by the estate” is found 
in section 503(b), which applies to both Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 
bankruptcies.77 Thus, holding that the bankruptcy estate always incurs 
capital gains liabilities would render the provision of such a choice 
meaningless, because all such liabilities would automatically be eligible 
for discharge.78 To preserve the choice granted to the government un-
der Chapter 13, the court concluded that the individual debtor re-
mained fully liable for post-petition capital gains taxes.79 
III. The Inescapable Plain Meaning of Chapter 12 
 By holding that post-petition capital gains taxes are incurred by 
the debtor rather than the bankruptcy estate, the Dawes III court rein-
forced a significant obstacle to the successful reorganization of a family 
farm.80 Nevertheless, the court properly interpreted the phrase “in-
curred by the estate” in light of the plain language of the U.S. Code.81 
Thus, because the plain language of the Code is inconsistent with the 
                                                                                                                      
70 See id. at 1240–41. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 1241; see 11 U.S.C. § 1305 (2006). 
75 11 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1); see Dawes III, 652 F.3d at 1241. 
76 Dawes III, 652 F.3d at 1241–42; see 11 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1). 
77 11 U.S.C. § 503(b). 
78 Dawes III, 652 F.3d at 1241; see 11 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1). 
79 Dawes III, 652 F.3d at 1241–42. 
80 652 F.3d 1236, 1239 (10th Cir. 2011); supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
81 See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b); Dawes III, 652 F.3d at 1239. 
2012 Dawes and Reorganization of Family Farms 97 
statute’s underlying purpose, Congress should modify the language to 
promote Chapter 12’s purpose.82 
 The interpretation of the phrase “incurred by the estate” has a tre-
mendous effect on the scope of a family farmer’s post-petition tax liabili-
ties.83 A family farm may have no significant assets beyond relatively il-
liquid farmland and farm equipment.84 Therefore, whether the sale of 
such farm assets creates additional, non-dischargeable tax liabilities has 
a profound influence on the efficacy of a Chapter 12 bankruptcy.85 If 
capital gains tax liabilities from the sale of such assets remain priority 
claims, a farmer may retain significant tax liabilities after the completion 
of the bankruptcy process.86 This inhibits the ability of Chapter 12 to 
provide a post-petition fresh start as intended by the legislature.87 
 The divergent holdings of the Circuit Courts in Dawes III, Hall, and 
Knudsen stem from the courts’ reliance on different sections of the U.S. 
Code.88 Whereas the Eighth Circuit relied on the definition of property 
in a bankruptcy estate, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits examined the In-
ternal Revenue Code’s characterization of the tax liabilities of Chapter 
12 estates.89 
 The Tenth Circuit’s conclusion in Dawes III, that the individual 
debtor incurs post-petition capital gains liabilities, is most consistent 
with the greater structure of the U.S. Code.90 Where, as in Dawes III, a 
court must interpret an ambiguous statute, it should first rely on the 
plain meaning of a term.91 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit properly relied 
on the definition of “incur” — “to become liable for” —when analyzing 
section 503(b)’s phrase “incurred by the estate.”92 
 Furthermore, after determining the definition of “to incur,” the 
court correctly looked to the Internal Revenue Code to establish who is 
                                                                                                                      
82 See Dawes III, 652 F.3d at 1239. 
83 See Porter, supra note 1, at 737–38. 
84 See id. 
85 See id. at 738. 
86 See id. 
87 See Knudsen v. IRS, 581 F.3d 696, 722 (8th Cir. 2009); supra note 19 and accompany-
ing text. 
88 See Dawes III, 652 F.3d at 1239; United States v. Hall, 617 F.3d 1161, 1163 (9th Cir. 
2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 2989 (2011); Knudsen, 581 F.3d at 706. 
89 See Dawes III, 652 F.3d at 1239; Hall, 617 F.3d at 1163; Knudsen, 581 F.3d at 706. 
90 652 F.3d at 1239; see I.R.C. § 1398 (2006). 
91 See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (“[T]he meaning of a stat-
ute must . . . be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain . . . 
the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.”). 
92 See Dawes III, 652 F.3d at 1239. 
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liable for post-petition capital gains taxes.93 By noting that filing for 
Chapter 12 bankruptcy does not create a “separate taxable entity,” the 
Tenth Circuit rejected the assertion that the farmland sold was property 
of the bankruptcy estate and dismissed its non-priority status.94 Because 
the estate is not taxable and thus not liable for capital gains taxes, the 
individual debtor must incur the tax liabilities.95 Therefore, the Eighth 
Circuit’s reasoning in Knudsen appears to be fatally inconsistent with 
the plain language of the Internal Revenue Code.96 
 The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Dawes III undercuts the legislative 
intent with which Chapter 12 was enacted, making it more difficult for 
a distressed family farmer to obtain a financial fresh start.97 By holding 
that an individual debtor “incurs” post-petition capital gains liabilities, 
the Tenth Circuit increased the financial burden on family farmers un-
dergoing a Chapter 12 restructuring.98 The preservation of this non-
dischargeable tax liability impedes Congress’s stated goal of allowing 
small farmers to restructure liabilities while remaining operational.99 
Therefore, textual interpretation of Chapter 12 results in an outcome 
diametrically opposed to the statute’s underlying intent.100 Neverthe-
less, the court properly relied on the Code’s statutory language to clar-
ify the ambiguous term.101 Although the plain language of Chapter 12 
does not appear to promote Congress’s legislative purpose, the Tenth 
Circuit correctly enforced such language as the rule of law.102 
Conclusion 
 Chapter 12 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code was enacted to address 
the unique challenges faced by a financially distressed family farm. It 
was intended to allow farmers to reorganize liabilities without sacrific-
ing their livelihoods as farm owners. Yet, there is a current controversy 
                                                                                                                      
93 See id. 
94 See id. at 1240. 
95 Id. 
96 See 581 F.3d at 709; I.R.C. § 1398 (2006). 
97 See 652 F.3d at 1242–43; Van Patten, supra note 15, at 52–53; supra note 19 and ac-
companying text. 
98 See Dawes III, 652 F.3d at 1242–43. 
99 See id.; Van Patten, supra note 15, at 52–53; supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
100 See Dawes III, 652 F.3d at 1242–43; Van Patten, supra note 15, at 52–53; supra note 19 
and accompanying text. 
101 See Dawes III, 652 F.3d at 1242–43; Van Patten, supra note 15, at 52–53; supra note 19 
and accompanying text. 
102 See Dawes III, 652 F.3d at 1242–43; Van Patten, supra note 15, at 52–53; supra note 19 
and accompanying text. 
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as to whether capital gains tax liabilities from the post-petition sale of 
farm assets are subject to downgrade and possible discharge under 11 
U.S.C. § 1222(a)(2)(A). On the one hand, the Eighth Circuit held in 
Knudsen that such liabilities are incurred by the estate and can be 
downgraded to non-priority claims. On the other hand, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held in Hall that those liabilities are incurred by the debtor and 
must be paid in full. 
 In Dawes III, the Tenth Circuit relied on the plain meaning of “in-
curred” as well as the structure of tax and bankruptcy law in holding 
that such claims are incurred by the debtor and may not be down-
graded to non-priority status. Although the Tenth Circuit’s decision is 
inconsistent with the legislative intent underlying Chapter 12, the court 
correctly parsed the statutory language and arrived at the only logical 
interpretation of the disputed phrase. 
Brett Morrison 
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